Geoeconomics

This Policy Brief analyses the long-run effects of an economic decoupling between the political West (i.e. the EU, the US and their allies) and the East (first and foremost Russia and China). A decoupling of Russia from the US and its allies would have much more severe long-term impacts for real income in Russia (minus 9.7 percent) than in the US and its allies (minus 0.2 percent). The reason for the uneven distribution of costs lies primarily in Russia’s low economic importance compared with the US and its allies.

This article discusses the economic effects of a potential cut-off of the German economy from Russian energy imports. We show that the effects are likely to be substantial but manageable. In the short run, a stop of Russian energy imports would lead to a GDP decline in range between 0.5% and 3% (cf. the GDP decline in 2020 during the pandemic was 4.5%).

The Great Financial Crisis caused a deep recession and led to very large public deficits. When financial market tensions erupted, many European countries were forced to reduce their deficits. This ‘austerity’ is often credited with the disappointingly slow recovery during the years after the financial crisis. One reason for such a slow recovery could have been that the impact of a reduction in the fiscal deficits is larger than anticipated during a recession, especially if it is accompanied by financial market tensions. At the height of the financial crisis and in its immediate aftermath, this might not have been properly taken into account.

In an increasing number of sectors, concerns are rising that foreign firm participation may pose risks to public order. Many developed countries have adopted or extended their investment screening mechanisms to control inward foreign direct investment in strategically important sectors over the last years. This paper documents the development of investment screening in OECD and EU countries and provides the first discussion from an economic perspective. We review existing and propose new explanations for the adoption of investment screening. Our exploratory quantitative analysis suggests that countries with higher levels of technological development and with a stricter regulatory environment for foreign investment are more likely to introduce investment screening. Contrary to the popular wisdom, we do not find evidence that higher Chinese inward investments are associated with the implementation of investment screening.