This EconPol Report sheds light on the global supply of semiconductors. The analysis of value-added data for the US underscores the importance of semiconductors for advanced economies. Using global trade data and an extensive list of semiconductor-related goods, the authors provide a detailed description of the global semiconductor economy. While final chip exports have been dominated by Taiwan, China, and Korea at an aggregate level since the early 2010s, export leadership varies substantially across chip types. Moreover, the authors identify nine core countries in North America, Europe, and Asia that dominate semiconductor-related trade including material inputs and equipment. The nine countries exhibit substantial mutual trade dependencies due to the fragmentation of semiconductor production

This Policy Report assesses various options for EU climate policy utilizing a quantitative trade and environment model. The authors investigate the EU’s 2030 emission reduction target, evaluate the impact of the newly introduced Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and analyze different climate coalitions with the EU at their core, including the recently launched “G7-led Climate Club.” Thereby they assess the impact on both national and global emissions accounting for carbon leakage, on international economic competitiveness and changes in the global market shares of the EU, as well as on aggregate income gains and losses.

This Policy Report shows that reducing barriers and better harmonizing regulations within the EU would deepen the integration of the EU internal market for trade in services. This would lead to gains in value added across all sectors, strengthening Europe's economy and competitiveness and generating substantial welfare gains.

This report highlights the effects of international sanctions on Russia's economic performance up to mid-2024. Despite monetary tightening, Russia's early 2024 economic growth remained strong due to a tight labor market and continued credit expansion. The fiscal outlook has improved with more positive short- and medium-term projections despite increased military and social spending. The trade surplus remained almost unchanged, masking declines in both exports and imports. 

By international comparison as well as compared to other EU policies, the EU’s Cohesion Policy evaluation system is far developed and institutionalized. This report analyses the remaining gaps and shortcomings in the Cohesion Policy evaluation system against principles established by the OECD and others and provides recommendations on how to further improve it.

The EU is losing the global innovation race. EU industry invests less than its peers in R&D, it lags way behind in software and artificial intelligence, and its pharmaceutical component is at risk. For over 20 years the same companies, mostly from the automotive sector, have dominated EU innovation activity. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to gas supply in Europe dropping significantly, shaking the EU out of its complacency regarding energy procurement and consumption habits. The costs of going green on top of more expensive energy are putting a strain on European competitiveness, with higher energy prices hitting the chemical, steel and metal processing industries in countries like Germany, Spain or Poland particularly hard.

From the earliest announcement of the European Green Deal, the current EU political cycle has been defined by an unprecedented acceleration in the scale and pace of climate policy. Under difficult conditions that sometimes tested the ability to engage stakeholders, including various external shocks, the EU has put forward and largely passed an unprecedented legislative agenda, which was meant to have, and is having, deep impacts on the EU economy and society at large. Much has changed in the world since the European Green Deal and the “Fit for 55” packages were conceived, including a dramatic increase in industrial policy actions by Europe’s trade partners, a deteriorating geopolitical landscape, and an energy crisis that has been aggravated by these factors, all of which has led to persistent fiscal and economic pressures. 

In 2023, Russia experienced a 3.5% economic growth, but forecasts for 2024 indicate a slowdown to 1.5% due to tightened monetary policies and the expected global economic slowdown. Despite large military spending and Western energy sanctions eroding budget revenues, fiscal deficits have been generally kept under control. Intensified scrutiny of third-country firms violating energy sanctions widened discounts on Russian oil prices in late 2023. Generally, Russian import patterns remained relatively stable. In particular, EU exports of economically critical and common high priority goods to Russia in November 2023 represent just 2% of its prewar levels, underscoring the effectiveness of sanctions in halting direct exports. Besides China and Hong Kong, Türkiye and CIS countries became vital suppliers, meeting Russia's demand for economically critical goods and high-priority items.

 Despite EU restrictions, only around one-third of pre-war exports to Russia are fully sanctioned; most trade remains unaffected or subject to numerous exemptions. While exports have decreased by 32%, imports have increased by 17% due to innovative ways to bypass trade sanctions. China is Russia’s most important alternative country of origin for products under sanction: 61 percent of all products subject to sanctions come from China. The Russian economy shows signs of recovery, driven by robust domestic demand from wartime fiscal stimulus, contributing about 10% to GDP in 2022-23. Real GDP and industrial production have grown by 2.5% and 3%, respectively, indicating recovery from the economic crisis.